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Abstract.  Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods Global International System in 1971, the 
world economy has experienced significant currency volatility. The major economies of the 
world have addressed such volatility differently. The EU has chosen to follow a monetary union 
and introduced successfully a new currency. The U.S. has paid less attention to the fluctuations 
of the dollar and has pursued an independent monetary policy to promote national economic 
stability. Japan has seen its currency appreciate significantly. This paper argues that while trade 
and growth across the globe are doing well, financial developments are intensifying the 
competition between the U.S. dollar and the euro.  Four possible future scenarios are developed 
and discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the best years in several decades for global GDP growth was 2004 when it rose 
slightly above 5 percent (see Figure 1). Most major parts of the world recorded improved growth 
performance. Similar growth continued during 2005 but at a slightly reduced pace. Despite the 
surging energy prices, prospects for 2006 remain favorable. Such growth is projected to fall from 
about 4.5 percent in 2005 to about 4 percent in 2006 as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Global Outlook (Real GDP; percent change from four quarters earlier) 
   Source: World Economic Outlook (April 2007) 
 
Global trade has also recovered strongly since the downturn in 2001 and continues to be an 
important engine of growth, as reported in the International Monetary Fund (2005). It is currently 
expanding at something close to twice the rate of growth of world GDP as illustrated in Figure 2.  
Reductions in inflation in many countries have greatly improved the prospects for sustained 
growth. The improvements in performance and, in many cases, economic policies have been 
substantial and significant. Japan recorded stronger performance in 2005 than we have seen for 
some years. Among the industrial economies, the Euro area was almost alone in continuing to 
grow at a lackluster pace. 
 
In emerging and transition economies, there have been widespread improvements in 
economic growth. We have seen rapid growth not just in emerging Asia—including China and 
India—but in the transition economies of Europe, including Russia, the Ukraine and the new 
members of the EU—where growth performance has, so far, been largely unaffected by sluggish 
Euro area growth. In some emerging markets, real progress has been made in increasing the 
resilience of economies to withstand external shocks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Global Trade (SDR Terms; 3-Month Moving Average) 
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook (April 2007) 
 
The U.S. economy continues to be the primary engine of global growth. In the global 
context, however, it is the American current account deficit that gives greater cause for concern. 
But the US deficit is only one manifestation of the current global payments imbalance. As 
discussed in Krueger (2005), the persistently weak growth performance of the Euro area is 
another factor contributing to the US current account deficit. More rapid growth in Europe would 
ease pressure on the global imbalances. Europe's growth prospects depend crucially on structural 
reforms that would lead to more flexible and responsive economies. 
 
A more buoyant Japan would also help ease global payments imbalances. After a year of 
rapid growth to the middle of 2005, the economy has slowed in recent quarters—a result, in part, 
of a correction in the IT sector. But economic activity should firm over the course of 2005 thanks 
to much improved fundamentals. Over the medium term, however, further structural reforms will 
be needed to boost growth prospects at a time of rapid demographic change. 
 
Debt levels rose during the last recession as governments struggled to offset some of the 
effects of the downturn. A significant reduction in debt levels is essential if debt sustainability is 
to be achieved over the medium and longer term; and if governments are to have any room for 
maneuver with counter-cyclical policy and successfully to reduce vulnerability to outside shocks 
and changes in the economic cycle.   
 
Global Financial Instability 
 
The positive recent economic fundamentals have contributed to the financial stability of the 
global monetary system. We may also recall that the Bretton Woods system had proved to be 
remarkably durable, adaptable and successful. In the period up to 1971 the system of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates established as part of the postwar settlement provided a stable 
framework that fostered growth. The Fund's ability to provide its member countries with 
temporary financial support during balance of payments crises proved critical, on more than one 
occasion, to the maintenance of stability in the system as a whole.  
 
Nevertheless, the Asian crisis, and others in Russia, Argentina, Brazil and Turkey, taught us 
some valuable lessons. With hindsight, of course, it should have been more evident to many of 
those involved—including the IMF—that trouble was brewing for some of those countries. The 
proximate cause of the crisis in Asia was the sudden sharp reversal of capital flows away from 
the region. Net inflows to the Asian crisis countries were roughly 6.3 percent of their GDP in 
1995, and 5.8 percent in 1996. In 1997, net outflows were 2 percent of GDP, a figure that rose to 
5.2 percent the following year.  
 
Asia's experience in the late 1990s reminded us of things we already knew, but whose 
importance we perhaps underestimated. Fixed exchange rates and the poor regulation of the 
banking and financial sector in many countries had enabled banks to build up liabilities in one 
currency and assets in another. Government assurances that exchange rate pegs would be 
sustained left currency mismatches unrecognized. Devaluation then left financial institutions 
facing massive losses, or insolvency. Once the cushion of foreign capital was removed, the 
weaknesses of domestic banking systems were revealed—as was the impact on economic 
performance. The Asian crisis also underlined that the benefits of short-term exchange rate 
stability are greatly outweighed by the risks that pegged or tightly managed exchange rate 
regimes bring—not least from the danger of currency mismatches in the corporate and the 
banking sectors. Fixed exchange rates can result in very large—and sudden—changes in the rate, 
thus creating great volatility and lost output over the longer term. The move to flexible exchange 
rates in most countries has reduced vulnerabilities. An overview of exchange rates is given in 
Fischer (2001) and a discussion of global instabilities can be found in Malliaris (2002) and 
Salvatore (2005). 
 
To achieve a strong, well-regulated financial sector means addressing issues such as non-
performing loans, capital adequacy, and effective supervision. Financial institutions need the 
appropriate incentives to develop the skills required to assess and manage credit risk and returns. 
Effective bankruptcy laws—that strike the right balance between creditors' and debtors' rights—
need to be in place. 
 
The U.S. Trade Deficit 
 
In recent years, exports have grown faster than imports in China, resulting in an overall trade 
surplus. In other countries, including the United States, imports have grown faster than exports, 
resulting in an overall trade deficit. A large and continual trade deficit may also be troublesome 
to the extent that it increases U.S. reliance on international borrowing—the sale abroad of U.S. 
bonds and other securities.  Also, China has emerged as a major source of U.S. imports, leading 
to a widespread view that the record overall U.S. trade deficits of recent years are “made in 
china.” In reality, China is the major player but other player also do affect U.S. traded deficit.  
 
The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China alone accounted for about $162 billion in 
2004 or nearly one-quarter of the total U.S. trade deficit, up from a minor share in the mid-
1980s.  Figure 3 highlights the growing contribution of China to the overall deficit and the 
declining contribution of Japan over the same period. Coming at the same time as record overall 
trade deficits, the rapidly growing bilateral trade deficit with China has prompted calls for new 
barriers to U.S.  
 
China currently has the largest bilateral trade surplus with the United States; relative to the 
size of China’s economy, the surplus is even larger. Analysts estimate that the U.S. current 
account deficit, now 6 percent of GDP, would need to drop to 2–3 percent of GDP in order to 
achieve long-run sustainability (Kouparitsas, 2005; Roubini and Setser, 2004). Thus, without 
reductions in other bilateral imbalances, sustainability could not be achieved even if the U.S.–
China trade deficit dropped to zero. 
 
Chinese exports of textile and apparel products to the United States have continued to grow 
as a share of total U.S. imports at the industry level and as a share of U.S. domestic consumption. 
 
Despite the recent emphasis on textiles and apparel, where U.S. imports from China soared in 
early 2005 following the elimination of U.S. quotas on these products, Chinese competition in 
other manufacturing industries has been growing even more rapidly. 
 
As with textiles and apparel, to a large extent these Chinese gains have come at the cost of 
traditional exporters. The depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the euro and the Canadian 
dollar has reinforced this trend by redirecting U.S. import demand toward China, Japan, and 
other East Asian exporters.  
 
Now, Chinese producers have proved to be experts at producing increasingly sophisticated 
products. Chinese auto parts are already entering the U.S. market in substantial quantities; 
imports of Chinese-built vehicles are expected as early as 2007. 
 
Restrictions on imports from China impose higher costs on U.S. consumers, who now have 
to pay more for products. With the United States and other trading partners (for example, the 
European Union and Brazil) imposing or threatening to impose safeguards on Chinese apparel 
imports, in May 2005 the Chinese government responded by proposing export restrictions on the 
same products, thus “voluntarily” limiting their exports. 
 
Figure 3: U.S. Balance on Current Account (Billions of Dollars) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
The current state of global imbalance is unsustainable and calls for immediate actions to 
prevent the fall of the dollar, which could drastically affect not only the U.S., but the rest of the 
world as well.  Moreover, the surge in oil prices and threats of terrorism and the ongoing war 
with Iraq are major challenges faced by the U.S. and the world as it struggles to fiscally 
reestablish itself. 
 
Large drops in national savings with consequent drops in federal budget balance in recent 
years accounts for the increasing current account trade deficits. Tax-cuts that have been 
introduced by the U.S. government in order to counter the problem have led to a significant 
increase in private consumption and decrease in savings. This together with the rapidly 
increasing government expenditures mainly for defense purposes has led to record fiscal deficit.  
 
The effects of fiscal policy on the current account balance remains unclear.  Studies suggest 
that fiscal policy changes are a poor and costly (both internally and globally) way of reducing the 
current account deficits.  The effects of an increase in government savings on the current account 
balance during a year of high productivity could be more than offset by increased consumption 
and drop of savings.  Moreover, an inappropriate monetary policy can nullify the effects of a 
modified fiscal policy (Barth and Patricia, 2006). 
 
Although there is an uncertainty regarding the appropriate fiscal policy that the government 
should adopt, the current fiscal state is unanimously considered to be a cause of concern (Barth 
and Patricia, 2006).  Analysts predict that rigorous changes in fiscal policy by way of decreased 
government expenditure will indeed decrease the current account balance.  But this will come at 
very high economic costs not only within the U.S. but in other parts of the world as well.  
Therefore, in the absence of policy changes to boost consumption in the emerging economies, 
the fiscal tightening will make little or no difference in bringing down the current account 
balance.   
 
With the baby boomers approaching retirement, the government expenditure on their social 
security and medical care will further deteriorate the financial situation.  The refusal of the White 
house to increase the taxes in the face of soaring costs in various sectors, has made the 
government’s aim of cutting the budget deficit by half by 2009 an unrealistic dream.  
 
The long-term interest rates were kept from increasing this far mainly due to the easy 
monetary policy, lack of complete understanding of the fiscal stance in U.S. by foreign investors 
and continuing support from foreign central banks.  But if Japan and Europe continue to grow as 
expected and the foreign investors begin to loose confidence in the heavily indebted U.S., the era 
of American supremacy may soon come to an end with the possibility of the euro replacing the 
dollar as the international currency.   
 
Impact of the Euro 
 
Following the introduction of the euro in January 1999, there has been an increase in co-
movements in financial asset returns as a result of greater integration and economic 
interdependence between the economies of the European Union. According to the assessments of 
Cappiello, Hordahl, Kadareja and Manganelli, (2006), although the increase in co-movements 
has been more pronounced in the bond market, there has been reasonable increase in the equity 
market as well.  
 
While most of the increase in co-movements in the equity market is due to the large member 
states of the euro area, both the large and small member economies in the euro area encountered 
significant increase in integration in the bond market. Moreover, the presence of “cross Atlantic 
factors” is more pronounced in the equity market; that is there has been an increase in co-
movements between the larger euro area economies and countries like the U.K. and U.S. after 
the introduction of the single currency.  However, the degree of integration with other non-euro 
countries like Japan continues to be low in both the equity and bond markets.   
 
With regard to the impact of the introduction of euro on asset pricing, a change in the term 
structure risk premia was observed. This change is a result of changes in the dynamic behavior of 
macroeconomic variables after the introduction of the euro and the changes in the market-price-
of-risk factors.  While, the average premia has remained the same as before, there has been a 
reduction in its variability because of smaller macroeconomic shocks after the launch of euro.  
However, the macroeconomic factors that best explained the variability of the premia continue to 
be important even after the introduction of the euro. 
 
Figure 4: U.S. / Euro Foreign Exchange Rate (U.S. Dollars to One Euro) 
    
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
 
The EU and the Role of Euro 
 
The European Union has recently expanded from 15 to 25 members. Bulgaria and Romania 
are expected to join in 2007. Those joined on May 2004 were: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Croatia and Turkey have 
recently started negotiations. In December 2005, the European Council decided to grant 
candidate country status also to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with whom 
accession negotiations have not started yet. In order to join the Union, they need to fulfill the 
economic and political conditions known as the 'Copenhagen criteria', according to which a 
prospective member must:  
i. be a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of 
minorities  
ii. have a functioning market economy; adopt the common rules, standards and policies that 
make up the body of EU law 
 
The euro is the official currency of the EU. It was introduced to world financial markets in 
1999 and launched as a currency in 2002. The euro is strongly advancing both economic and 
political integration between the participating EU member states. All EU member states are 
eligible to join if they comply with certain monetary requirements. The euro is managed and 
administered by the European Central Bank. 
 
Outside Europe, the euro has been a success as well. Economists have studied the data from 
the euro’s first few years in operation and found more of an increase in the supply of euro 
denominated assets outside of Europe than within the EMU.    
 
About half of euro land trade with non-euro area residents is invoiced in the new currency. 
The euro’s share in international debt securities has risen to above 30 percent. The euro’s share 
of foreign exchange transactions reached one quarter in Continuous Linked Settlement data. 
Including forwards and swaps the dollar was involved in 89 percent of all transactions and the 
euro in 37 percent. In short the euro is the second international currency, after the dollar. 
 
A high euro scenario would have many European countries joining EMU by the end of this 
decade. Most eager to join are the ten countries that joined EU in May 2004.  Possibly Denmark, 
Sweden and U.K. will join the euro. In this case euro land exceeds the U.S. in income and trade. 
The key question is whether U.K. joins, because it would bring with it the London financial 
markets. By mid decade it did not look likely that Britain would join in the coming ten years. 
Real growth has been slower in Europe than United States for some years due to lower 
population growth. US monetary policy in the first part of the current decade was looser than 
ECB monetary policy.  
 
All of the above developments are challenging the future leadership of the U.S. dollar as a 
global currency.  In what follows we evaluate the intensity of the competition between the euro 
and the dollar.  
 
China 
 
Our discussion so far sheds light on the mounting trade and budget deficits of the U.S. and 
identifies Europe, China and Japan as its major contributors.  While Japan and EU have flexible 
exchange rate regimes, China continues to maintain its exchange rate rigid in spite of growing 
pressure from the U.S. to appreciate the yuan.  Although this alone cannot guarantee the 
restoration of global stability, it can help reduce U.S. deficits significantly as a result of a 
decrease in consumption of Chinese goods by the U.S.  
 
According to Frankel (2004), such an enhancement in exchange rate flexibility is in China’s 
own interests.   The build up of foreign reserves in the emerging economies especially China 
took place after the Asian crisis of the 1990s in an effort to guard themselves from being hit by 
similar currency crises in future.  However, China’s present level of foreign reserves is too high 
causing an inflationary pressure on its economy.  Moreover, in future, China will be better off 
investing domestically than continuing to accumulate foreign reserves, which has considerably 
low rate of returns.  He also stresses on the need to act early in making reforms toward the much 
needed appreciation of the yuan while conditions are still favorable (high economic growth and 
trade surpluses) and the economy can withstand any unanticipated consequences from such 
exchange rate fluctuations. Today there are essentially three options for China: 
i. Stick to its existing fixed exchange rate system, with the exchange rate close to 
yuan/dollar 
ii. Liberalizing the currency similar to the appreciation of Japanese yen and euro   
iii. Gradual adjustment toward a flexible exchange rate regime 
 
Clearly, adopting a fixed exchange rate approach is unsustainable and will eventually lead to 
inflation.  In addition, the growing tension with its trading partners (particularly U.S.) further 
accentuates the need for an appreciation of the renminbi, thus leaving China with remaining two 
alternatives to achieve this.   
Meanwhile some economists including McKinnon (2005) argue that a change in the 
exchange rate flexibility cannot tackle the growing deficits problem of U.S. In fact, such changes 
can hit the Chinese economy hard resulting in a fall in economic growth and consequent 
deflation while U.S deficits continue to build up by way of imports from else where in Asia.   
 
A significant appreciation can make China a less favorable place for investment for both 
domestic and global firms.  In addition, the loss of value of dollar assets with respect to the 
domestic currency results in the decline of both consumption and investment.  In effect, China 
would meet with a similar fate as Japan did when it saw a sudden decline of the yen following 
repeated appreciations in response to growing pressure from the U.S.   
 
He further argues that the lack of savings in the U.S. is the main cause of the mounting 
deficits and hence an appreciation of the renminbi is not a solution to the global imbalance 
problem. Under a fixed exchange rate where employers don’t fear changes in exchange rate, 
international adjustment is brought about by a natural increase in wages in the more productive 
economies. For e.g., China, by keeping its exchange rate fixed has had a 13% increase in wage 
growth as compared to the U.S. with 2.7%. This growth triggered among the skilled workers has 
influenced growth of wage rates of unskilled labor as well.   
 
Also discussed is the possibility of China, in response to the growing international pressure 
making the yuan/dollar rate more flexible by restricting exchange rate changes to a narrow 
predefined controllable band. Such small changes in flexibility will not affect economic growth 
and the growth in wage rates will continue to resolve international differences in productivity 
and growth.   
 
Many others feel that gradual macroeconomic adjustment is the best approach for China and 
other emerging nations. Gradual introduction of reforms which encourage more domestic 
consumption and investment along with an increase in savings in the U.S. can bring reductions in 
the trade deficits, hence improving the overall economic condition. Similar reforms in euro area 
countries have proved a success after a relatively slow and shaky start. 
 
To sum up, although the existing fear of the negative effects of a change to a flexible 
exchange rate is justifiable to a certain extent, the current levels are highly exaggerated. A very 
slow adjustment toward exchange rate flexibility approach is adopted by China, along with 
similar measures from other emerging nations can help solve the global imbalance issue. Glick 
(2005), Papademos (20060 and Rajan (2006) offer certain lessons from Europe’s monetary 
integration that may be useful for Asian countries. 
 
Possible Future Scenarios 
 
Table 1 gives an account of the changes in the shares of the various major currencies in the 
total foreign currency reserves held over the years.   
 
The dollar, which replaced the Pound sterling after the Second World War to become the 
hegemonic currency, continues to grow with a share of about 63.5% of the world’s currency 
reserves. The substantial growth shown by the Japanese yen came to an end with the recession of 
the late 1990s. The deutsche mark was doing exceptionally well until it was replaced by the euro. 
Immediately after its introduction in 1999, the euro became the second major global currency 
with around 19.3 percent of the world’s currency reserves held in euro by 2002.   
 
Table 1: Reserve Currency Holdings (Original IMF data) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: EU, U.S. and Japan 
 
  
 
As seen from Table 1, the three major global reserve currencies are the U.S. dollar, euro and 
the Japanese yen. In addition, all the key characteristics mentioned in Table 2 are quite favorable 
for these three economies. The unsustainable growing deficits of the U.S. on one hand and the 
recovery of the Japanese and euro area economies on the other, are posing a threat to the future 
prospects of the dollar as the international currency. With the recession in Japan hindering the 
growth of the yen, the real competition has now been reduced to one between the other two 
currencies namely the dollar and the euro.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Key Statistics for 2006 
Country/ 
Location 
Area 
(sqkm) 
Population 
(million) 
GDP(PPP) 
($trillion) 
GDP-percapita(PPP) 
($) 
World 510.072 million 6,525 60.71 9,500 
USA  9,631,420 298 12.36 41,800 
EU 3,977,487 460 11.72 25,480 
NAFTA 21,588,638 430 12.89 29,942 
ASEAN 4,400,000 553 2.17 4,044 
UK  244,820 60.6 1.83 30,300 
Canada  9,984,670 33 1.114 34,000 
Mexico  1,972,550 107 1.067 10,000 
China  9,596,960 1,314 8.859 6,800 
Japan  377,835 127 4.018 31,500 
India  3,287,590 1,095 3.611 3,300 
Russia  17,075,200 143 1.589 11,100 
Source: CMF World Factbook 2006 
 
So, how will the world economy take shape in the future? Four possible scenarios are 
discussed below. 
 
Scenario 1: If the current trend of the dollar’s decline and euro’s appreciation continues, by 
2020 the euro will equal the dollar and will further overtake it as the international currency. This 
is illustrated in Figure 5.        
                                                               
Figure 5:  Disciplined Decline in the Dollar and Appreciation of the Euro at 10 percent annual rate 
 
Source: Frankel and Chinn(2005) and Modified by the Authors 
 
There are two alternate views on the persistence of the current situation, which are discussed 
in Bordo (2005).     
 
Some fear a sudden inevitable readjustment will take place with a dramatic decline of dollar 
leading to drastic consequences in the U.S. as well as in the rest of the world. European and 
Japanese economies can expect a big hit as consumption for their goods in the U.S. will go down 
while China with its undervalued yuan will continue to do well.  Moreover, it is anticipated that 
in such a situation, the emerging economies may switch from accumulating U.S. securities to 
accumulating euro thereby causing further dollar depreciation.  
 
The opposing view is one that expects a gradual and less harmful currency adjustment 
comparable to the one in the 1980’s. The imbalances are traced to the accumulated savings of the 
aged in Japan and Europe and hence no threat to the U.S. securities held by the other economies 
is expected.  Moreover, after the Asian crisis, the emerging economies have been building up 
dollar reserves to shield them from a future crisis. Bordo (2005) compares the present scenario 
with four historical episodes namely: 
 
i. Prewar gold standard era, which saw a build up of surpluses and deficits and 
persistence of current account imbalance similar to the present day.  The adjustment 
in this case happened gradually with transfer of capital from the surplus countries like 
Britian, Germany and France to the countries of the New World (Argentina, 
Australia, Canada).  It followed the price specie flow mechanism of the classical gold 
standard. 
ii. Interwar, where most of the countries adopted the gold exchange standard in which 
reserves were held in dollars, sterling and francs along with gold by U.S., Britain and 
France.  Adjustments were not smooth and the system eventually collapsed.   
iii. Bretton Woods, which was adopted after World War II and where the U.S, which had 
the largest gold reserves pegged dollar to gold making dollar the international reserve 
currency.  Failure of U.S. to follow stable monetary and fiscal policies, the build up 
of dollars in Europe and Japan and the opposition of France to the system, lead to its 
collapse in 1973. 
iv. 1977-1979, when the major countries of the world decided to adopt the system of 
managed floating exchange rates.  But high inflation rates, along with the continued 
decline of the dollar, eventually led to change in the system. 
 
His comparisons yield maximum similarity of the present scenario with the prewar gold 
standard scenario which had a benign outcome as opposed to the other four and expects a gradual 
and harmless change as had happened in the pre 1914 gold standard era due to similar levels of 
globalization and the continued relevance of the dollar as the international reserve currency.   
 
In his paper, Edwards (2005) discusses the effects of a correction in the current account 
deficits of the U.S. He does so by analyzing several reversals of the past (1971-2001) and 
concludes that large and industrial countries had a decline in real exchange rate and high 
inflation and interest rates.  In addition, there was a significant drop in GDP in the year of 
reversal which remained low for at least the next three years after which it picked up if the 
country’s trade improved. He explains the decline in GDP growth following the U.S. current 
account deficit adjustment of 1987-1991 based on his analysis. 
 
However, Edwards (2005) agrees that the U.S. presents a special case and might not incur 
such drastic consequences.  The dollar being the international reserve currency, the possibility of 
the U.S. sustaining such deficits cannot be ruled out. But eventually, an adjustment is 
unavoidable.   
 
With the growth of the world economy, the existence of a single successful hegemonic 
currency without eventually leading to global instability is highly unlikely. Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 
discuss the consequences of more than one nation adopting a currency.   
 
Scenario 2:  If the U.S. incorporates U.K. and perhaps NAFTA, then the rate of decline of 
the dollar may slow down or may even reverse.  The red dotted curve in Figure 6 illustrates this.   
 
 Figure 6: Euro and Partners versus U.S. and Partners (various scenarios) 
 
Source: Frankel and Chinn (2005) and Modified by the Authors 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect on the 1st of January, 1994 with 
the intention of removing most trade barriers and establishing free trade between U.S., Canada 
and Mexico, the three member countries. All three countries have benefited from the agreement 
especially Mexico which has seen a rapid economic growth and rise in employment since the 
NAFTA.   
 
Following the crises in Mexico and Asia and the success of the euro, there has been much 
debate on the pros and cons of adopting a single currency by U.S., Canada and Mexico. 
 
Two possible approaches to this goal have been identified; adoption of the U.S. dollar as the 
single common currency in the area (dollarisation) and the creation and adoption of a new 
currency (monetary integration).   
 
Dollarisation has been mostly ruled out as it would mean loss of sovereignty over monetary 
policies, complete loss of seignorage revenue and lender-of-last-resort-facility for Canada and 
Mexico.  Monetary integration on the other hand is much more viable. (Chriszt 2000) 
 
Although, the benefits of such a monetary union by means of increased trade and stability of 
economies have been recognized, its occurrence in the near future is unlikely. Canada and 
Mexico continue to favor their flexible exchange rate system.  In all three countries, the idea of 
replacing the current monetary system with a common central bank is yet to gain popularity.  
There are also growing concerns over matters like dominance, lender-of-last-resort and 
seignorage.   
 
Yet another likely scenario is a monetary union involving the NAFTA and U.K. The 
lukewarm growth of the euro-area economies has resulted in U.K. not favoring a euro union.  
This along with excellent relations with U.S. and Canada has increased the prospects of a union 
with NAFTA.   
 
Such a union will prove to be much more successful that the EU and will in fact lead to the 
creation of a single largest common currency in the world.   
 
Scenario 3: On the other hand, if U.K. and perhaps the 10 new members of the EU adopts 
the euro as its currency, there could be an even faster overtaking of the dollar by the euro as 
compared to Scenario 1. (Black dotted curve in Figure 6)  
 
Figure 7: Fast Growers (real GDP growth, average percentage change 1950-97) 
 
 
Source: Angus Maddision, 2003, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD) 
 
Scenario 4:  With the success of the euro, prospects of a similar monetary union in Asia are 
high. This is especially true because of the presence of some of the largest and the fastest 
growing economies in the region (Figure 7). Such integration can give the area the much needed 
exchange rate stability, which can help prevent future crisis and enhance further economic 
growth in the region.   
Japan’s recovery after more than a decade of stagnation together with phenomenal and 
consistent economic growth in China(8%) and India(6%) are creating opportunities for increased  
integration in trade and investments benefiting not just these countries but the rest of Asia as 
well.  In fact more than 50% of their foreign trade is with each other and ASEAN comparable to 
EU at 60 % (see Figure 8), making east Asia an optimum currency area of the 21st century.   
 
Figure 8: Intraregional trade (as share of total trade) 
 
Source: FRBSF (2005) 
However, in contrast to the EU there is a lack of political solidarity among the leading 
countries in Asia which is crucial for monetary integration to take place.  Moreover, all Asian 
countries primarily depend on trade outside the region as opposed to European countries which 
were much more economically self contained. Although, there has been a significant increase in 
intra regional trade, it still involves mostly unfinished products and raw materials. Another factor 
differentiating the two regions is the absence of a stable and prominent currency like the 
Deutsche mark in the region. All this make the integration process a very distant prospect 
(FRBSF 2005). 
 
According to Eichengreen (2006), a solution to this problem is the Parallel Currency 
Approach where he suggests the creation of an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) as a weighted 
average of the existing Asian currencies and to let it coexist alongside the different currencies in 
Asia. Not only does this eliminate the need for stabilizing the exchange rates of the individual 
currencies, it creates a stable currency that could be used in trade and investments within Asia.  
Such an approach will need less political solidarity until the ACU proves to be a success in the 
market indicating the readiness of the region for a monetary integration. 
 
He further adds the need for the involvement of the central banks and governments of the 
participating countries to encourage the use of the ACU among the financial and non financial 
firms. This is because of the stiff competition faced by ACU from not only the national 
currencies but also the dollar, the most popular global reserve.    
 
Some authors like Mundell (2002) recommend the use of the dollar as the parallel currency.  
However, with the growing integration and growth of trade among the countries in Asia and the 
prospects of a dollar decline can lead to the establishment of a single Asian currency.   
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper argues that global economic development has progressed at a rapid rate during the 
last few years with the U.S. economy acting as the engine of growth since its brief recession in 
2002. In contrast to global trade stability and growth, currency markets have experienced 
substantial volatility. The EU has chosen to overcome such volatility by establishing the 
European Monetary Union and introducing a common currency in 1999. The euro has been thus 
far a great monetary success and has continued and actually expanded the international 
significance of the German mark. The currently unsustainable balance of payments deficits in the 
U.S. have diminished the strength of the dollar and analysts are concerned about the future 
leadership of the dollar. We argue in this paper that at least three possible scenarios may develop.  
First, without any new membership in the EMU one may expect a disciplined decline of the 
dollar and a further strengthening of the euro. A second scenario involves the expansion of the 
U.S. to include the U.K. and also the NAFTA in a new Pan American Monetary Union.  Such a 
development may stop the decline of the dollar or may actually reverse its current course and 
lead to its strengthening.  The third scenario envisions the U.K. actually joining the EMU, which 
will result in a further increase in importance of the euro as a global currency. In addition, if the 
10 new member states of the E.U. satisfy the convergence criteria and join, the euro could be 
strengthened further.   
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